I am an Economics Ph.D. Candidate at Georgetown University and a 2022 NAEd/SPENCER Dissertation Fellow.
I work on topics that evaluate students' responses to college admissions processes and how candidates’ perception of risk shapes electoral outcomes. I use both theory and empirical methods in my research.
I will join Columbia University, Teachers College as an Assistant Professor of Economics and Education in 2024 after spending one year as a postdoc at the Development Innovation Lab (DIL) at the University of Chicago.
You can find my CV here
Primary fields: Applied Microeconomics, Economics of Education
Secondary fields: Development Economics, Political Economy
Contact: cc1599@georgetown.edu
Policies aimed at increasing the number of students from underrepresented groups enrolled in college are common worldwide. Many of these policies can result in strategic responses by high school students. Yet, little is known about the extent to which these responses undo the effect of the policy. This paper shows that centralized college admission policies that rank students within their high school lead to strategic relocation of students, which undoes part of the effects of the policy. Relying on a policy change in Chile, I use detailed administrative data and a simple theoretical model to show that high school students react to these sorts of college admission policies by switching schools, undermining the policy effects. I find that the number of low-income students accepted to the top colleges increases by less than 1 percent under the current. policy, but if students had not switched high schools, that increase would be 5 percent, a reduction of 90 percent in the policy effectiveness. In addition, switchers target high schools with lower average GPAs, and they significantly increase their probability of attending selective colleges. I argue that relocation is an important pre-college response, which needs to be considered when designing policies using schools as target characteristics, as it can completely undermine said policies.
Related Popular Writing: Development Impact Blog
A desirable property of democratic elections is that they should not be influenced by forces that reveal no information about the candidate. However, the extant literature suggests that precipitation has a significant impact on electoral outcomes. This paper investigates an understudied dimension of weather—sunshine. Using novel daily weather measurements from satellites, linked to county level U.S. Presidential electoral returns from 1948-2016, we document how sunshine affects the decision making of voters. We find that election day exposure to sunshine increases support for the Democratic party on average. Additionally, we show that— contrary to prior findings that do not control for sunshine—precipitation has no detectable impact on partisan support, but universally depresses turnout. To rationalize our results we propose a mechanism whereby sunshine modulates voter mood which causes a change in voter choice, while precipitation only impacts turnout through increasing the cost of voting. We then build a theoretical model, which features this mechanism, and generates additional tests that find support in the data. Our main result—that election day sunshine noticeably impacts voter choice—highlights the need to reduce the effect of election day shocks (e.g. by allowing early voting). Furthermore, our results regarding precipitation suggest that reducing costs to voting does not confer partisan benefits—a potentially policy relevant finding for the current vote by mail discussion.
This article provides an overview of the literature on mobility in developing countries. Explicit distinctions are drawn between directional and non-directional measures, absolute and relative measures, and combinations thereof. We note that the scarcity of panel data has hindered the measurement of mobility for many countries. We pay particular attention to the recent development of panel-free mobility measures, which allows us to measure upward mobility in 147 countries. We use these measures to revisit some central themes in the literature.
Increasing opportunities for students from historically disadvantaged populations and communities have been the focus of many different policies around the world. Yet, little is known about how these policy shape students' high school choices. In this paper, I examine whether a policy in Chile that mandated all institutions using the centralized system to incorporate a student's high school-specific criterion affected students' ninth-grade school choice. I exploit the adoption of the policy and the local school market structure to estimate the effects of the college admission criteria on the quality of the school students attend. Preliminary estimation indicates that students in local markets with high scope for gains are two percentage points less likely to attend a high-quality public school. To study the effects of different policy changes in the college admission process, I follow Otero et al. (2022) and estimate a joint school choice and outcomes model.